Introduction and Importance

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP-1), Warfighting is the foundational document that communicates the keystone philosophy for the Marine Corps. It provides the basis for all learning within the Marine Corps and is as valuable to a private as it is for a general. Every officer must read and reread the text, understand it, and take its message to heart. The philosophy contained in this publication has influenced the Marine Corps’ approach to every task. MCDP-1, Warfighting states, “War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously.” As war evolves, so too must those who are prepared to wage it. It is the responsibility of every officer to study, understand, and apply the principles of MCDP-1.

Prerequisites

MCDP-1, Warfighting must be read prior to this class. This hand out and the class are supplements to foster understanding. They are not viable substitutes for reading the publication.

In This Lesson

This lesson will elaborate on the concepts presented in MCDP-1, Warfighting to prepare you for future endeavors at TBS and beyond.

This lesson covers the following topics:

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Learning Objectives

Terminal Learning Objectives

MCCS-OFF-2102 Given a tactical situation, apply the warfighting concepts of the USMC to accomplish the mission.

Enabling Learning Objectives

MCCS-OFF-2102e Without the aid of reference, define war without error.

MCCS-OFF-2102f Without the aid of reference, describe the nature of war without error.

MCCS-OFF-2102g Without the aid of reference, describe the spectrum of conflict without error.

MCCS-OFF-2102h Without the aid of reference, describe the levels of war without error.

MCCS-OFF-2102j Without the aid of reference, describe the maneuver warfare concepts without error.

How to Utilize MCDP-1, Warfighting

*MCDP 1, Warfighting* is not designed as a reference manual; it is designed to be read from cover to cover. Each chapter is a stepping stone to the next and has a natural progression. Chapter 1 describes our understanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war. With that knowledge, chapter 2 discusses the theory of war, both comprehensively and specific to execution. Chapters 3 and 4 expand this theory to provide the foundation for how we prepare for and wage war.

Realize that *MCDP 1, Warfighting* is not the prescriptive answer for the completion of task. It is the “authoritative basis” that arms every Marine to develop their own answers to their own situations. *MCDP-1* provides theory for how to think, not what to think. Therefore, the discipline is to understand that your solution to a problem is not the only solution, as there is seldom one perfect answer.
War’s Definition and Essence

“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” – Karl Von Clausewitz

As indicated above, war is boundless. It is unlimited in its path or direction, infinite in its character and severity. The only constants of war are its definition and essence.

The definition of war is, “A violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force.” Note how vague the definition is. Groups are identified as the actors, not a specific group such as nation-states or terrorists. Likewise, the action is simply a violent clash with no specificity provided. War is elegantly simple in its definition. In its intricacies, war is exceedingly complex.

The essence of war is described as, “...a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.” Given the nature of complex religious, national, and tribal relations, will is the catalyst for struggle. The Warfighter understands that the actor of war that maintains their resolve can impose that will on their enemy. Conversely the actor who loses their will to struggle can be imposed upon. This then becomes the primary target for any actor; destroy the will, destroy the enemy.
Nature of War

“We thus conclude that the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.” -- MCDP-1, Warfighting

With war defined and its essence described, we have already identified some of the attributes that are found in varying degrees given a violent struggle. Given war's nature, dynamically and characteristically, all actors of war will struggle maintaining their will to fight. Fear, uncertainty, chaos, disorder, friction, instability all serve to erode their resolve. To be successful given the environment, we seek to maintain our determination by mitigating those inherent forces that make the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible.

We define **Battlefield Dynamics** as the elemental forces directly attributable to the wartime environment. While there are several seen and unforeseen, we have limited our discussion to eight. They are:

1. Friction
2. Uncertainty
3. Fluidity
4. Disorder
5. Complexity
6. The Human Dimension
7. Violence and Danger
8. Physical, Moral, and Mental Forces
Nature of War (continued)

**Friction:** “Friction is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” Of all war’s attributes, friction can be singled out as the most comprehensive and encompassing. It erodes will by frustrating the actors involved. We combat our own erosion of will by mitigating friction we can influence, but more to the point, fight effectively given friction we cannot influence. We identify four types of friction.

1. **Mental Friction:** Simply put, mental friction is indecision. Commander’s frequently self induce mental friction by searching for the perfect solution. Indecision typically is the result of doubt given the uncertain environment and fear of making a mistake. We can mitigate this friction through training and practice, experience, and confidence in what we know and what we don’t know.

   “*It is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until the time of action is past.*” -- Karl Von Clausewitz

2. **Physical Friction:** Friction by way of its physical impact on the actor. For example, multiple strands of barbed wire (enemy obstacles) will physically interfere with any perpendicular movement. An enemy stream of automatic gunfire will have the same effect. We can mitigate physical friction through contingency and skills training to allow us to successfully combat the effect.

3. **External Friction:** Any interfering effect from an object or action that is out of our immediate control. Weather that prevents a helicopter from being able to fly; ice that causes you to have an auto accident; a grenade not exploding when thrown; the effect of the enemy’s actions; all are external to your immediate control. Like physical friction, we seek to mitigate by training to limit the effect.

4. **Internal Friction:** Internal friction is self induced. This is the most avoidable of all the types friction. It often incubates when we opt for a complex action when a simple one will suffice Therefore we mitigate the effect by applying the simplest solution that will yield success given a situation.
Nature of War (continued)

**Uncertainty:** Described in MCDP-1 as the “fog of war,” this aspect is closely related to friction as it is a catalytic component of mental friction. The indecision these situational unknowns cause are precisely why we must be willing to make decisions in the face of incomplete, inaccurate, or contradictory information. The inability to do so breeds inaction, preventing the actor from imposing will. We can mitigate the effect of uncertainty by gaining as much information as possible, and making reasonable assumptions based on the information available.

**Fluidity:** Given all the influencing agents in war, the environment rapidly changes as those involved struggle to impose their will. Restricted and inflexible thought will frequently succumb to the dynamic atmosphere or war. Disciplined and elastic thought will allow you to operate with fluidity in consonance with the environment. In this case, the actor that can most quickly adapt will have advantage over the actor who cannot.

**Disorder:** In the midst of the fight, friction, uncertainty, and fluidity will cause well laid plans to go awry. Information will be unavailable or misinterpreted causing ineffective actions. Rather than control each event, we must work within the disorder, seeking the exploitable fleeting opportunities that disorder typically creates.

**Complexity:** Given all of the above, it is easy to see how complexity becomes prevalent in the conduct of war. The reason; war is governed not by individual actors but by collective action. Attempting to simplify the environment by centralizing control under an individual turns a blind eye to the true nature of war, and limits our ability to move in consonance with the fluidity of each situation.

**The Human Dimension:** By nature, humans are not predisposed to killing. It goes against society’s norm. In this regard moral factors add to the dynamics on the battlefield. Further, because war is a struggle of will, human emotional capacity and physical capacity will be taxed. We will be expected to operate in the face of fear of our own mortality, sorrow of losing a peer, collective friction, exhaustion, lack of sleep, etc. The ability to do so effects the will to fight and makes the Human Dimension a battlefield dynamic.

**Violence and Danger:** Closely related to the Human Dimension, the goal is to be able to control the Human Dimension to maintain the will to fight. A harrowing experience, the battlefield will test the limits of all involved. We can mitigate the unavoidable effect of violence and danger by knowing and testing the limits (through training) of ourselves and those we lead. Further, the mitigation of the other attributes of war will allow the actor to focus more, consciously or subconsciously, on dealing with violence and danger.

**Physical, Moral, and Mental Factors:** Quantifiable effects of physical factors such as how many people we have versus the enemy, is easy to conceptualize. The effect of the intangible moral and mental factors described above are more difficult to identify, yet they have the greatest impact on the ability to maintain our will through the fight.
Theory of War at the Comprehensive Level

To this point, much has been said about the will of war’s actors. What about the will of the people that form the support of the acting group? In our case, and more specifically, what about the will of the American people? This question strikes at the heart of our theory of war which states war must serve policy. United States policy is determined by the American people through their election of officials, which means national policy is simply the collected goals and objectives of the people. Therefore, should the will of the people wane, the will of the actors will not matter. This phenomenon is part of the burden of democratic nations governed by the people. In contrast repressive and dictatorial groups are less affected by the will of the people they govern, unless revolution is a possibility. To understand the concept of war serving policy, we must understand the levels of war and the spectrum of conflict.

Levels of War: There are three levels of war; strategic, operational, and tactical.

1. The strategic level is the highest level and is composed of two types; national strategy and military strategy. For the same reasons that our will to fight as Marines is subordinate to the American people’s will to fight, military strategy is subordinate to national strategy. That is to say, military strategy only comes into play when the national strategy demands it, backed by the will of the American people. An imperfect association to the task organization of the military would be the joint chiefs and the pentagon.

2. The tactical level is the lowest level of war. It is the specific application of combat power to defeat an enemy force in combat at a particular time and place. It concerns the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in the execution of the missions. A squad ambushing an enemy; a company securing a city; a joint operation clearing a province are all examples of the tactical level.

3. The operational level is the level that links the tactical level to the strategic level by guiding tactical results to attain strategic objectives. To understand, let’s review in conjunction with the strategic and tactical levels.

   a. World War II was the war. The strategic level dealt with how to fight the war as a whole.

   b. The Island Hopping Campaign was a campaign of World War II. It was operational in nature, and dealt with the art and science of how to handle the specific issue of Japanese advancement in the pacific.

   c. The Battle for Guadalcanal was a tactical level fight. It dealt specifically with winning the battle and seizing control of the Japanese bases on the island. It was part of the Island Hopping Campaign designed to alleviate enemy pressure in the pacific (operational), which contributed to our winning the war (strategic).
Theory of War at the Comprehensive Level (continued)

The levels of war are frequently displayed with the figures below.

How does the compression occur and what does it mean for Marine officers? To understand and answer this question, we must discuss The Spectrum of Conflict.

The Spectrum of Conflict: Conflict can take several forms that occur in varying frequency and with varying risk. Conflict can be very low intensity humanitarian operations, or high intensity all out war between countries and beyond. In general, low intensity conflict happens with greater frequency, and because they are low intensity offer less risk to both national strategy and the actors involved. Conversely, high intensity conflict and all out war offer more risk and therefore are less likely to occur.

Spectrum of Conflict and Will: The reason high risk conflict is less likely is because it requires greater collective will to withstand the violence and therefore be successful. In contrast, low risk conflict requires less collective will since there is less violence to overcome to be successful. Using Haiti as an example of low intensity humanitarian operations, there is little risk of military conflict. There is a risk of disorder and violence, but relatively speaking, it is small. There is also little risk to national strategy as it is unlikely that the Untied States would be seen as an unfavorable actor. Given the decreased risk, the need for collective national will is small, as the American people are not exposed to death of service members, and are generally liberal in their contribution to humanity.

Using World War II as an example of high risk conflict, military conflict was obviously the norm not the exception. In this case the American people were subjected daily to death and tragedy and therefore the need for collective national will was large. The reason the America people were willing to provide such resolve was because there was a tangible, observed threat to the United States, demonstrated by the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Theory of War at the Comprehensive Level (continued)

Take note that we are discussing national collective will. It can be argued that the variance in the will of the actors (i.e. service members) is less as complexity, uncertainty, and friction (in some form) remains high in both low and high intensity conflict.

**The Spectrum of Conflict and Levels of War:** With an understanding of the spectrum of conflict, its relation to the levels of war becomes a little clearer. As the intensity of conflict increases, so too does the separation of the three levels of war. The reason for this is the will of the people is at a required high, therefore the ability to process violence and tragedy (human dimension) increases. As a result of the increased action across the levels of war, one single tactical action (of many) has less effect on the American people and therefore national strategy. Conversely, in lower intensity conflict the national collective will is not required to be high, and therefore a violent tactical action has more influence on the will of the people. In turn, there is a greater effect on the national strategy given the tactical action. The figure below summarizes these relationships.
Theory of War at the Comprehensive Level (continued)

Importance to a Marine at the Tactical Level (You): Understanding (to this degree) war theory has two extremely important impacts on your development as a Marine officer that must be realized.

1. *The lower the intensity of conflict, the more impact you and your Marines at the tactical level have on the strategic level of war.* Your success at the tactical level will yield increasing benefit to national military strategy the less intense the conflict; because your success will maintain the limited will of the American people. Marines know this as the “strategic corporal” effect.

2. *You can be uniformly successful at the tactical fight and lose the strategic fight.* This typically occurs when the operational and tactical approach was flawed, no matter how quantitatively successful the actions were. This is where the art of war gains meaning. If a violent (high intensity) approach is taken when a more discerning (low intensity) approach is more applicable, the resolve of the American people wanes and therefore so does the national military strategy. (Think about the strategic effects of Marines’ actions in Haditha, Iraq.)

How does level of war compression occur and what does it mean for Marine leaders?
Theory of War at the Execution Level

At the execution level the Marine Corps utilizes several theories to ensure success. Summarized, they are:

1. Initiative and Response
2. Styles of Warfare
3. Combat Power
4. Speed and Focus
5. Surprise and Boldness
6. Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities
7. Creating and Exploiting Opportunity

**Initiative and Response:** In war you are either; imposing your will on the opponent through initiative, also known as the offense; or responding to the opposition’s imposition of will, also known as the defense. In this regard, the offense allows us to strike the enemy with our will, where as the defense allows us to withstand the enemy’s will. The goal of defense is to maintain the status quo of the current situation. The goal of the offense is to advance change from the current situation. An easy analogy is football. The offense on the field is attempting to advance from the current situation on the twenty yard line to the opposition’s end zone. The defense on the field is attempting to maintain the status quo on the opposition’s twenty yard line, preventing the opposition from advancing their situation into friendly territory. Hence, war can be seen at its basic execution as a series of advance, hold, advance, hold, advance ultimately to the strategic goal. The phenomenon of the counter-attack combines the defense and offense. The maintaining (defending) element is resisting when through the fluidity, friction, and uncertainty of war an opportunity opens to seize the initiative from the enemy and move into an attack (offense). Back to our football example, through the conflict of the offense and the defense, the defense intercepts the ball, thereby seizing the initiative from the offense.
Theory of War at the Execution Level (Continued)

**Styles of Warfare:** There are generally two types of warfare that militaries engage in, attrition and maneuver warfare.

1. **Attrition Warfare:** The basic essence of attrition warfare is pitting strength against strength, attacking a problem head on. Actor A brings all the firepower and materiel to bear on actor B who attempts to do the same. In this regard, the more death exacted on the opposing actor yields success. Pure attrition doesn’t really occur, however attrition focused warfare does. Perhaps the most famous example of attrition based warfare is the stalemate trench warfare of World War I's Western Front.

2. **Maneuver Warfare:** Maneuver warfare attempts to attack a problem from a position of advantage by circumventing the mass of force and attacking the system. As Marines, we seek to fight an unfair fight by gaining every advantage we can and destroying the enemy systematically. Take the example of the flu. You can take aspirin to combat the pain and the swelling, but your recovery from the infection will be long. Apply an antibiotic and you attack the infection systematically shortening your recovery. We seek to do the same to the enemy. To accomplish this we must hit the enemy hard at the right place and at the right time. We call this the *decisive point.* The remaining theories of war-execution enables us to accomplish this systematic defeat of an enemy.
Theory of War at the Execution Level (Continued)

**Combat Power:** In our execution of maneuver warfare, we seek to strike at the decisive point to be victorious. Because the decisive point is our objective, it becomes the focus of our effort, and therefore where we apply our combat power. Combat power is the total destructive force of our will we can bring to bear on our enemy. We can build combat power by tangible means (such as superior numbers and technology) and intangible means (such as effects of maneuver, tempo, surprise, or will). We build combat power by *massing* the effects of all these means.

**Speed and Focus:** In our discussion of combat power, you probably picked up on the need to focus our efforts. Focusing our effort at the decisive point is critical to maximizing our combat power. Speed and more specifically tempo also help us build greater combat power. If we can identify the decisive point that allows us to systematically defeat the enemy, and hit the enemy hard at that point with a speed greater than he can react, then we seize the initiative.

**Surprise and Boldness:** Both of these theories allow us to further our combat power by shocking the enemy’s psyche, eroding their will to fight by turning the dynamics of the battlefield against them. Surprise allows us to build power by shocking the enemy into inaction, striking in a fashion that they are unable to respond to. This typically goes hand in hand with bold decisions made on the battlefield, even in the face of friction and uncertainty.

**Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities:** We have discussed building combat power by focusing our efforts, acting with speed, hitting the enemy in such a way that they cannot respond, through bold action. We have discussed applying combat power at the decisive point. The question becomes, how do we identify that decisive point that allows us to defeat the enemy systematically? We accomplish this by identifying the enemy’s center of gravity and related critical vulnerability.

1. **Surfaces and Gaps:** We frequently apply the concept of surfaces and gaps when discussing center of gravity and critical vulnerability. A surface, as its name applies, is the hard part of the enemy; a strength. Consider the offensive line of a football team. It is the surface, where the team is strong designed to protect the quarterback. In contrast, the defensive line of the opposing team attempts to create and/or exploit gaps (weaknesses) in the offensive line, to strike the quarterback defeating the offense system. As maneuvering warfighters, we seek to maneuver through gaps, avoiding surfaces.

2. **Center of Gravity:** The center of gravity is the one strength that provides power to the enemy allowing them to impose their will. It is the one surface that we seek to avoid in order to attack the enemy’s system.
Theory of War at the Execution Level (Continued)

3. **Critical Vulnerability:** The critical vulnerability is the one weakness that allows us to defeat the enemy system by circumventing the center of gravity. Another way to look at it is the critical vulnerability it the one weakness that allows us to defeat the enemy center of gravity without striking the center of gravity head on, rendering the center of gravity useless. *The critical vulnerability is the decisive point we seek to strike the enemy at with focused combat power, defeating the enemy systematically.*

**Creating and Exploiting Opportunity:** Throughout the conduct of war, given the uncertain, fluid, friction-filled environment, fleeting opportunities will be created by our action or external factors. We must be flexible, wed to no particular course, disciplined enough to operate within this fluidity to quickly take advantage of these fleeting opportunities.

Preparing for War

“The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision…the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.” -- Hans von Seeckt

“Our doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it sets forth general guidance that requires judgment in application. Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive.” -- MCDP 1, Warfighting

“A leader is a man who can adapt principles to circumstances.” -- General George S. Patton

**Doctrine:** With all war’s variables, theories, and actions therein, the most important task for a military to conduct is training. The basis for much of this training is doctrine which outlines the fundamental concepts and principles for the conduct of war. It is important to remember that our doctrine is principle based, not prescriptive, and requires critical thought by our leaders.

**Professionalism:** Marine Corps doctrine requires a professional and disciplined approach. Our conduct of war requires leaders and the lowest level capable to make effective decisions and lead effective action as fluid as the battlefield itself. A lack of professionalism erodes to the commander’s confidence that the small unit leaders will execute within their intent. Further it raises the possibility of an adverse strategic corporal event.
Preparing for War (continued)

**Training:** Often this goes without saying, but just as often too much training focus is provided on the tangibles; tactics, techniques and procedures, equipment, physical conditioning. It is not that these are unimportant, far from it, but it can be easy for a unit to ignore the intangible training such as; planning, human factors, emotional, psychological, and concepts training. This is the reason training must duplicate battle situations as much as possible, allowing for training in the intangibles as well as the tangibles.

*Earl H. Ellis, “It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry men...of high morale: they must be skilled...men who know it can be done – Marines with Marine training.”*

**The Conduct of War**

“*Now an army may be likened to water, just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and weakness.”* -- Sun Tzu

“The challenge is to develop a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield. It requires a concept of warfighting that will help us function effectively in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment.” -- MCDP 1, Warfighting

**Maneuver Warfare:** Much has already been said about maneuver warfare. When discussing the conduct of war, the lynch pin is the capability to apply the maneuver warfare theory. To develop this ability there are several concepts.

1. **Orienting on the Enemy:** To attack the system, fundamental to maneuver warfare, we must orient ourselves on the enemy. We study, analyze, and form reasonable predictions about the enemy. This allows us to orient or familiarize ourselves on how the enemy’s system operates in preparation and execution, identifying the unique characteristics that make the enemy’s “system” function. This allows us to identify ways to penetrate, control, or destroy the key components by identifying the critical vulnerability that will render the center of gravity ineffective. In this case we exploit the enemy’s vulnerability to impose our will. This means that our proactive and reactive actions are determined by the enemy.

2. **Decision Making:** Once the commander has oriented on the enemy, the commander must be willing to make appropriate decisions in the fashion required by the environment. Decision making is a time competitive process that gives a tremendous advantage to the commander who can quickly make an effective decision and turn that decision into action. It can be an intuitive or analytical process depending upon time available. To be successful, commanders must develop the ability to accept a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk and do it more quickly than the enemy.
The Conduct of War (continued)

3. **Philosophy of Command:** Commander’s command philosophy in the exploitation of the enemy *must* be one that empowers subordinates to act on their own initiative. The commander accomplishes this by communicating a clear centralized vision to subordinates after the exploitation of the enemy is envisioned. The centralized vision provides the ability for subordinates to increase tempo and seize opportunities during execution, as they are empowered to act on their own; decentralized from direct commands, provided it matches the central vision. This builds fluidity of action on the battlefield allowing us to seize initiative from the enemy.

4. **Commander’s Intent:** The commander’s intent is the centralized vision described above. You can also consider it the “long-term contract.” Again, it allows subordinates to understand the reason, or the larger context of the operation harmonizing their actions to the overall effort.

5. **Mission Tactics:** Closely related to commander’s intent, mission tactics is the assigning to a subordinate a mission without telling them how to accomplish it. Again this fosters initiative and fluidity of action while in the fight. The subordinate understands what needs to happen, why it needs to happen, allowing them to design and adjust how the mission is accomplished. This means that the most important aspect becomes the “why” behind the mission, as the subordinate can adjust what action occurs as long as it accomplishes the “why.” Mission tactics are considered the “short-term contract,” providing subordinates the latitude to make decisions altering the plan based on the opportunities presented them.

6. **Main Effort:** In the communication of the mission type order, the commander must identify the element that is considered the Main Effort. The Main Effort is the commander’s “bid for success” and therefore is focused on striking the enemy’s critical vulnerability. The Main Effort describes both an element and an action, recognized as the most critical action to be taken to defeat the enemy. Because the Main Effort is the bid for success, the commander “weights” the main effort by providing it mass of effort. Possibilities for weighting the Main Effort include, but are not limited to, leadership, materiel, combined arms, or personnel. It requires the acceptance of risk elsewhere as there is a finite amount of military mass available.

7. **Combined Arms:** To support the efforts on the battlefield, the commander seeks to employ combined arms. Combined arms are the full interaction of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem but a dilemma – a no-win situation.
Summary

What You Have Learned: To understand how and why the Marine Corps’s warfighting doctrine is utilized we have discussed the nature, comprehensive theory, and execution theory of war, supplementing the material you read in MCDP 1, Warfighting. We have discussed how this influences our training for and conduct of war and conflict; with a particular focus on maneuver warfare, decentralized command philosophy, commander’s intent, and mission tactics. The culmination of which is the appropriate identification of the capability to exploit the enemy systematically allowing us to impose our will on the enemy.

Where You Are Going Next: MCDP 1-3, Tactics, using MCDP 1, Warfighting as its foundation, expounds on how we fight, the tactical art and science of warfare, honing your ability to apply Marine Corps warfighting doctrine on the battlefield. MCDP 1-3, Tactics is the required reading for your next tactics class, Intro to Tactics - Tactical Fundamentals.

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